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Summary: 
There are three apparent competing routes to providing re-assurance about the quality of digital 
forensics work:  accredit the individual expert, accredit the laboratory and its processes, let the courts 
test via its procedures.  The strengths and weaknesses of each are discussed against the variety of 
activities within “forensic science”. The particular problems of digital forensics, including its 
complexity and rate of change, are reviewed. It is argued that formal standards may not always be 
practical or value for money compared with advisory good practice guides. 
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How do we reassure our customers that they can rely on the expert technical evidence that we 
produce? Our customers include not only the courts but the investigating agencies, judges and 
lawyers who commission us.  They also include lawyers engaged in civil disputes and in some 
instances large corporations carrying out internal investigations. We provide evidence that almost by 
definition a non-specialist audience cannot evaluate for themselves, so that trust is of the essence. 
There seem to be three routes: accreditation or certification of those who give evidence, 
accreditation of the laboratories and processes upon which they may depend, and reliance on 
testing via court procedure and cross examination. Each have strengths and weaknesses. Whichever 
we choose, though, has to be both practical in terms of implementation and financially viable in 
terms of delivering value for money. 
The issue of method of accreditation is not wholly theoretical and academic. The authorities both in 
the United States and in the United Kingdom, among others, are seeking arrangements by which 
non-certified individuals and laboratories may be denied contracts or may even be forbidden from 
giving evidence in courti. Although the advantages of such policies seem obvious there are also 
drawbacks if schemes are clumsily conceived. This is particularly true for digital forensics.  
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Individual accreditation 
The accreditation/certification of an individual depends partly on their qualifications and partly on 
their experience. Any scheme, if it is to have credibility, must be based on objective criteria. It would 
be unfortunate if accreditation depended solely on friendship with a self-appointing self-
perpetuating collection of experts. Awkward decisions have to be made about the governance of 
such a scheme; it needs credibility itself. It would also be unfortunate if there were a multiplicity of 
rival accrediting organisations. 
What would the criteria actually be? In the digital forensics field there are any number of post 
nominals available. Some will be degrees from recognised universities, others from voluntary and 
commercial training organisations and yet others signify no more than that someone has taken a 
training course in one specific analytic product and been presented with an extravagantly printed 
certificate at the end. In all cases much will depend on the syllabus under which the qualification 
was obtained, how up-to-date it is and how far there have been refresher courses to cope with the 
ever-changing digital landscape. How is one to measure experience? Will a mere recital of lists of 
cases be sufficient or will it be necessary to consider a collection of actual reports? Where do you 
get your assessors from?  In the scheme once used in the United Kingdom a selection of reports was 
read by assessors against a list of desirable criteria to demonstrate skill. Qualifications had to be 
“proved” by the production of appropriate certificates and statements from referees were also 
required. The UK scheme, which aimed to cover all forms of forensic science activity, was abandoned 
because its government sponsor had hoped that it would become self-funding, which it never did.  
Neither did it help that applications for registration were voluntaryii. Many of the concepts though 
live on in arrangements used by the Dutch judicial system (https://english.nrgd.nl/). 
 
Laboratory accreditation 
The accreditation of laboratories and processes seems to offer fewer practical problems of 
implementation. The chosen international standard is ISO 17025. This standard specifies the general 
requirements for the competence for laboratories to carry out tests and/or calibrations, including 
sampling. It covers testing and calibration performed using standard methods, non-standard 
methods, and laboratory-developed methods. It is not specific to forensic science. It seems to work 
well for traditional “wet” forensic science laboratories which carry out series of individual tests on 
DNA, blood, fibre, fingerprints and paint fragments.  Senior forensic scientists will have researched 
the underlying science and arranged for it to be written up in a peer-reviewed journal; they will have 
designed tests which incorporate the science but also cover the management aspects of practical 
forensics – to include recording and reporting. Once established, commoditised routine work can be 
passed on to forensic technicians. The overall process needs “validation”.  For each process what is 
required is a statement of end-user requirements, a formal specification, a risk assessment 
indicating the potential limits of the value of the process, a formal statement of the acceptance 
criteria, a formal validation plan followed by an exercise and assessment followed by a report 
supported if necessary by a library of results. All this must be properly documented.  At the end of 
the process there is a statement of validation completion. Assessment is carried out by a third party. 
This is the scheme currently promoted by the UK’s Forensic Science Regulatoriii.  
There has been some discussion of the possibility of producing a standard for the evaluation of 
evidenceiv though this has concentrated mostly on problems associated with statistics.v   Another 
proposal under consideration is trying to find a standard for “case review” which would cover the 
work of defence expertsvi. The proposed standard is ISO 17020 which in its original design specifies 
requirements for the competence of bodies performing inspection and for the impartiality and 
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consistency of their inspection activities. But there are grounds for wondering what an assessment 
on these bases would look like and whether the issues are better tested via court procedure. 
 
Court procedures 
Testing via court procedure can obviously only take place either at trial or shortly before. Some 
countries follow variants on the US practice of making novel scientific evidence an issue of 
admissibility with the judge acting as a gate-keeper against “junk science”.  It follows the so-called 
Daubert testsvii to demonstrate that a method is generally accepted by the scientific community: 
that a theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable and testable, has been subject to peer review and 
publication, and that there is a known or potential error rate. The UK adopts these broad ideas, but 
within the discretion of a judge, via the Criminal Practice Directions 19A 3-6viii. 
In many jurisdictions there will be codes of practice or regulations governing the presentation of 
expert evidence.   Among these will be requirements for the contents of an expert report. Typical 
elements will include: a statement of an expert qualifications, the instructions given to the expert, a 
list of material considered (which might include exhibits seized by others but also reference material 
and literature), extent of dependence on others, investigations carried out, results, analyses of 
alternative hypotheses, and conclusionsix. An obvious implicit requirement is that a suitably qualified 
expert hired by “the other side” should be able to follow each step and carry out their own testsx. 
The actual circumstances will vary between jurisdictions. For example, where the criminal procedure 
is accusatorial (as is the case in procedures based on the English common law and widely used in 
countries formerly part of the British Empire) a prosecution expert report will be made available 
before trial to a defence expert and there may be discussions to identify points of agreement and 
disagreement prior to trial start. In courts based on the European code system the procedure is 
inquisitorial where much of the investigation is managed by a judge as opposed to the police by 
themselves. The judge will want to have access to an expert and it will only be at trial that the 
expert’s work is tested.  In both cases, however, what is actually eventually happening is detailed 
peer review by a defence expert of the work carried out by the prosecution expert. In effect this 
testing can only take place if the respective experts with their appropriate levels of competence can 
be identified – which brings us back to how we accredit the individual.  Much may also depend on 
the skills and knowledge of the presiding judge. 
 
Variety of “forensic science” 
One of the questions one must ask is whether a single scheme of accreditation works across the 
entire range of activities within forensic science. In addition to the series of commoditised single 
purpose tests envisaged within ISO 17025 expert evidence can also rely heavily on the experience of 
an individual. This is particularly true of psychiatric and psychological evaluations where there is 
seldom much in physical form to be tested; if there is doubt about the evaluation of one psychiatrist 
then the usual route is simply to call in another qualified medical professional and give them the 
opportunity to interview and look at the life history of the subject. But it is also true that many 
experts are required to carry out reconstructions of events; typical instances could involve road 
traffic accidents and murder scenes. The forensic scientist will have physical evidence to examine 
and will need to carry out a series of tests on each element but the actual reconstruction requires 
experience. An expert report will need to spell out all the elements involved in reaching a particular 
reconstruction and it will need to have sufficient detail so that another expert can agree or disagree. 
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A properly written report will look at alternative hypotheses and perhaps assign percentage 
probabilities to any favoured interpretation. 
The importance of separating a technical investigation and evaluating its implications was discussed 
in a recent editorial in Digital Investigationxi.  ENFSI has a publication Guideline for Evaluative 
Reporting in Forensic Sciencexii.  OSAC’s publication A Framework for Harmonizing Forensic Science 
Practices and Digital/Multimedia Evidencexiii has a useful chapter on reasoning in forensic science 
and distinguishes between abductive, deductive and inductive reasoning. “Abductive reasoning 
eliminates implausible explanations and retains the most plausible explanation for (limited) available 
facts and traces, drawing analogies from past experience. Deductive reasoning tests this most 
plausible explanation against observable traces, possibly through further study of facts, with 
particular scrutiny for contradictory facts (falsification). If any contradictory traces are found, the 
most plausible explanation must be revised. Inductive reasoning can lead to knowledge specific to an 
event or a case, providing decision-makers with trustworthy understanding of the traces to help 
them make decisions. Inductive reasoning can also lead to a theory generalized from multiple cases 
or from repeatable experiments, providing newly established knowledge in forensic science.”  
 
 
What is special about digital forensics? 
Digital forensics has some special qualities which do not fit easily into any of these accreditation 
plans. Most digital devices are akin to a whole scene of crime. There will be a large number of 
potential artefacts and different requirements of how they are to be handled. In the simplest of 
situations all that may be needed is to show that a particular file is present. But often what is also 
expected is an account of how that file arrived on that device – and what inferences one might draw 
as a consequence. A file might have been generated by the owner of the computer, it could have 
arrived as an email or email attachment, via social media, via web browsing, via file sharing. A 
prosecution case may need to be built up not just on the basis of one file but of a sequence of events 
– successive use of web browsing, sequences of emails and social media postings and so on. An 
expert may be invited to draw conclusions about a subject’s courses of action, research and what 
can be inferred about intent. And this is on the assumption that the files of interest are all extant 
and that no data recovery of deleted material is called for. 
A second feature is rate of change: hardware, operating systems, and application programs are 
constantly being updated. As a result, software tools can become rapidly obsolete.  I sought to deal 
with the implications of this back in 2009 in an article Forensic Science Standards in Fast-Changing 
Environmentsxiv.  If anything, the problem has become more acute as rates of change have speeded 
up; smart phone apps may be “updated” as often as every two weeks. The essential problem is that 
the speed of change is much faster than the rate at which an artefact with evidentiary potential can 
be identified and analysed, written up in a peer reviewed journal article, published and then made 
the subject of a reliable tool – which itself would then need to be validated.  
Then there is the problem of examinations which are “one off”, or at least that is how things start. 
This is particularly true of the increasing number of circumstances where hardware must be 
examined; examples include “off chip” and JTAG physical examinations, IOT devices and devices 
associated with automatic teller machines and point-of-sale systems. But it can also be true when a 
new app, messaging service or social medium appears and very quickly acquires large numbers of 
followers.  Often these issues arise because there is an immediate investigative requirement – what 
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is the law enforcement officer to do if he is told that there is no current approved forensic 
technique?   
Another issue raised in the same article has also become more acute. In practice most digital 
forensic examinations use not single purpose tools but integrated analysis suites which offer, among 
other things, safe forensic imaging of original devices, automated recovery of deleted files, a series 
of viewing environments for the contents of the devices, complex searches, facilities to extract 
material to produce exhibits, and the automated generation of reports. Without such integrated 
tools productivity would drop near to zero. Almost no computer investigations would be completed 
at timescales acceptable to the courts – or indeed to the public; already in the UK non-urgent 
computer and phone examinations by law enforcement may have waiting lists of over six months.  
What is relatively new has been the appearance of “evidence finder” type products aimed at 
providing many examination facilities for the less skilled. Smart phone examinations, of the limited 
sort, can be carried out on “kiosks”xv. These products offer results at lower costs and higher speed of 
delivery than the more traditional suites which require greater levels of technical knowledge and 
need more training. But how do you apply testing of the sort envisaged in ISO17025, particularly 
when the products themselves are, as they must be, subject to frequent updating? 
 
Problems of standards 
In the 2009 article I wrote: “Where this leaves us is that if current proposals for certifying the output 
of forensic science labs and tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence are enacted strictly large 
sections of computer-related evidence will either not be allowed to emerge from the labs or be 
ruled inadmissible by the courts.  Digital evidence will have to be at least a year perhaps more 
behind the ways in which computers are used by organizations and individuals – and criminals.” This 
is a particular problem in the US if the Daubert tests are strictly applied.  A further problem with 
Daubert and indeed ISO 17025 is the emphasis on “error rates” associated with a particular tool or 
method. In the context of much traditional “wet” forensic procedures error rates are important, the 
more so if they can point to probabilities and “likelihood of evidence”. But here too there is a poor 
fit with the digital forensics, a matter discussed interestingly and at length by the Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence in its publication “Establishing Confidence in Digital Forensic Results by 
Error Mitigation Analysis”xvi in which the authors list out the types of errors that can occur and show 
how few of them lend themselves to estimates of rates of error. “The primary limitation of testing is 
that no amount of testing can prove that the tool is functioning correctly in all instances of its use. 
Even if all tests produce the expected results, a new test scenario could reveal unexpected results. “ 
One of the problems with standards is a tendency to bloat.   This is particularly true of those that 
have moved beyond the original aims behind standards, which was that if screws and other 
mechanical objects were being manufactured by several companies they should all work together 
and also that they featured quality sufficient for the tasks they being asked to perform, for example 
not fracturing prematurely and allowing users to work with them safelyxvii.  
The people charged with developing the more abstract type of standard seem to keep adding 
features – and boxes to be ticked – because they believe that the greater the level of detail the 
“better” the standard is. But standards are not an end in themselves; they come into existence 
because it is hoped that there are wrongs that can somehow be corrected.  The ever-increasing 
world of standards committees can become detached and self-referential. They run the danger of 
forgetting why they exist. Compliance with standards costs not only in requiring change in business 
processes and in demanding extensive documentation but in paying the independent assessors.xviii In 
the end there has to be a value for money test measured against how far the identified wrongs are 
Page 6 
 
being corrected. Most of forensic science is paid for from public funds gathered via taxation. This is 
true whether the direct purchaser is a law enforcement agency, a prosecutor, a judge or a defence 
lawyer.  
Those who have complained about standards “bloat” can find themselves accused of not caring 
sufficiently about “quality” or being told that the job of a standards body is about excellence and 
that costs are a policy problem for someone else. It is instructive to look at the standards relating to 
information/cyber security. The standards now adopted originated in the mid-1990s in the United 
Kingdom through what was then called BS 7799. The modern form is the ISO 27000 series. It has 
become very expensive to adopt in its complete form so much so that only very large organisations 
can afford it. However instead of insisting on compliance and saying that those who fail should not 
be allowed to operate or forbidden certain types of contract. NCSC/GCHQ evolved a program called 
Cyber Essentials, the aim of which is reasonably clear from its namexix. In effect is exists in two forms, 
the lower involves self certification and a higher external certification. This pragmatic approach 
achieves many of the aims of having regulation/guidance in the first place without disproportionate 
expensexx.  
Throughout this debate about quality the issue of cost is often forgotten. A survey carried out in the 
UK in 2017 reported costs to achieve ISO 17025 of tens of thousands of pounds sterlingxxi; many 
respondents described the costs as disproportionate particularly as the prosecution and legal aid 
authorities were, as part of broader government economic policy, seeking to reduce fees for 
substantive work – from which the assessment costs would have to come. But of course, the people 
who do the assessment need to be paid – and the greater the level of detail required from them the 
larger the fee they will require. One of the many reasons why the earlier UK scheme for registration 
of forensic practitioners failed was that assessors had to be drawn from the ranks of highly 
experienced technicians/investigators but were only paid £40 ($50) for each assessment; but there 
was also resistance from candidates who felt that even the £165 fee was too much; no wonder initial 
enthusiasm rapidly evaporated. 
 
Solutions? 
How do we take this forward?  Part of the problem is that too much of the public policy discussion 
about improvements to the provision of expert evidence to the courts has proceeded on the basis 
that the entire issue is “forensic science” as opposed to the other roles of the expert, which as we 
have seen,  can involve evaluation and interpretation of ambiguous results,  reconstruction of 
events, and the provision of background information about particular commercial practices,  
technologies and socio-cultural phenomena.  It is also worth remembering that the function of the 
courts is, in criminal cases, to see if a prosecutor has assembled enough evidence to persuade that 
there should be a conviction under a specific statute or common law, and, in civil cases, to reach a 
conclusion in a dispute between citizens.  Science is an assistance in this process, not a determinant 
nor is it a role of the courts explicitly to decide on “science”.  
 
The conclusion must be that, however one may wish it otherwise, there is no single “one size fits all” 
route to assuring quality in digital forensics evidence and it is a mistake to try and force any one 
solution. The ISO 17025 route to certifying processes looks as though it will struggle once one moves 
beyond the simple tasks of evidence acquisition and preservationxxii;  even here although the 
situation is stable for hard disk acquisition matters are less clear given the ever-hardening 
protections on access to smart phones, the increasing requirement for evidence from social media 
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and the variety of cloud storage. Many practitioners also point out that ISO 17025 refers to 
laboratory processes and that, since for the most part they are working on forensic image copies and 
not originals, much of digital forensics is not conducted in anything that can properly be described as 
a laboratory.   
But peer review of an expert report by an opposing expert implies the existence of a cadre of reliable 
people willing and able to carry out the work – and there are few national standards and no firm 
international standards for accrediting them.  
 
Let’s return to the question at the beginning of this article. How do we reassure our customers that 
they can rely on the expert technical evidence that we produce? Given the special qualities of digital 
evidence, that individual devices usually contain many different potential artefacts, that 
interpretation of a crime scene is often required and the speed of technological change, we need to 
recognise that the aim of bureaucratic simplicity – “here is the one type of accreditation to look for 
and you will be able to rely on the results” – is alas doomed to disappointment. That, or a rigid 
system which will result in many forms of plausible evidence being denied the courts and with the 
result that criminals go free. 
 
We will have to make do with a rather messy combination of tests for reliability. ISO 17025, ISO 9000 
and ISO 27037 have benefits for accrediting digital evidence acquisition and preservation.  It is 
however interesting to note that ISO 17025 does not provide an absolute guarantee of quality. At 
the time of writing the UK scheme is faced with two major problems associated with companies that 
were registered, though neither operated in the digital domain. One has former employees facing 
criminal charges involving data manipulationxxiii and another failed financially leaving the police to 
have to fund substantial amounts of retestingxxiv.   
In terms of accrediting individuals, it would probably pay national governments to invest in schemes 
to which they are willing to give authority; it may be that they could rely heavily on piggybacking on 
selected existing certification and accreditation schemes. Perhaps an advisory board could identify 
worthwhile qualifications to guide prospective customers and the courts – while stressing the 
importance of seeking evidence for continuing professional development. 
A further useful solution can consist in the creation of detailed Good Practice guidancexxv, as 
opposed to mandated standards, which can then be applied in specific cases on a discretionary basis 
by judges and after hearing arguments from lawyers and experts. In the UK there is a bill currently 
before Parliament setting up a forensic science regulator on a statutory basis and charged with 
producing a code of practicexxvi. Although the regulator would have powers to investigate, breaches 
of the code would not automatically incur criminal or civil liability; but the courts would plainly bear 
such breach in mind. Much will depend on what any code of practice actually says. The forensic 
science regulator is also currently seeking arrangements by which if an expert is criticised by a judge 
that criticism is made available widely to judges and those who commission forensic science 
activityxxvii.  
There is no doubt that this mixed approach lacks the clarity and simplicity many people desire but in 
striking a balance between the problems of achieving a “pure” scientific approach to accrediting 
forensics and the need to see that the courts can cope with the latest in cybercrime and cyber 
breach activity we must remember that the administration of justice has always needed strong 
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pragmatic qualities.  And for customers seeking digital forensics expertise there is also the important 
additional route of seeking informed informal recommendations from others. 
 
 
 
Note: In addition to his practical, public policy, and academic work the author was the joint lead 
assessor at the UK’s Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners, served on the Digital 
Forensics Specialist Group of the UK Forensic Science Regulator, and advised the Netherland Register 
of Court Experts (NRGD),  SWGDE, and ISC2in its testing of CCFP. The author thanks Eoghan Casey for 
comments on an earlier draft.  
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